Hagopian v. Kechichian case comment – application of Ahluwalia

September 10, 2026

In this case, Justice Kraft of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice dealt with the wife’s request to amend her pleadings to include, among other claims, the new tort of intimate partner violence (IPV). This new tort was established by the Supreme Court of Canada in Ahluwalia v Ahluwalia earlier this year.

While the case of Hagopian v. Kechichian also determined issues of permitting questioning prior to trial and withdrawal of deemed admissions, this summary focuses on the court’s decision in terms of permitting the wife to add a claim for the new tort of IPV.

First, some background facts. Tania and Kevork were married on September 1, 1996, and separated on October 25, 2015. There are two children of the marriage, currently aged 26 and 23. This case has been before the courts for 9.5 years.  A 14-day trial is scheduled to begin on October 5, 2026.

Three weeks after the Supreme Court released its decision in Ahluwalia, Tania sought to amend her application to add various claims, including claims for the tort of IPV, assault, and battery. Kevork opposed the amendments, claiming he would be prejudiced at the upcoming trial if Tania were allowed to amend her pleadings at this stage to add additional claims. He argued that he would need comprehensive disclosure from Tania, including an outline of each alleged fact and its connection to the legal test for the new tort of IPV. He also said he would need time for further questioning, third-party production of documents and records, and possible third-party questioning of witnesses.

Tania argued that Kevork’s planned procedural steps related to the new claims were unreasonable. She had already agreed to an exchange of affidavits of documents and to attend questioning. Since the violence mostly occurred in private, there was very little to produce in terms of third-party witnesses and document productions.

Ultimately, Justice Kraft permitted some of Tania’s requested amendments to her pleading, including allowing her to add the tort claims for IPV, assault, and battery.

In reaching this decision, Justice Kraft noted that the Family Law Rules require the court to grant permission to amend a pleading unless the amendment would disadvantage another party in a way that costs or adjournment would not compensate. It is a high threshold, and the refusing party (i.e., Kevork in this case) is responsible for demonstrating prejudice if the amendment were allowed. Justice Kraft considered whether:

1. the amendment would cause an unjust process that cannot be fixed by an adjournment or costs
2. the amendment proposed is untenable (i.e., not properly pleaded and not prima facie meritorious in law (which means it’s unlikely to succeed)), or
3. the amendment is made in bad faith.

Part of the consideration was the timing of the request, given that the trial was scheduled to begin in a few months.

In considering whether Kevork would be prejudiced based on procedural steps he claimed he needed to take before trial, Justice Kraft ultimately agreed with Tania that many of these steps were unnecessary:

• In terms of his request that Tania map each alleged fact to the three-part test for the new tort of IPV, Her Honour found that:

… Ahluwalia does not require this type of pleading map. As established by the Supreme Court of Canada at paragraph 184 of that decision, to establish the tort of IPV, (1) a plaintiff must show that the abusive conduct arose in an intimate partnership or its aftermath, (2) the defendant intentionally engaged in that conduct, and (3) the conduct objectively constitutes coercive control. The Court explicitly clarified that the new tort does not require a plaintiff to prove any consequential harm separately, as the harm is necessarily present and liability follows once the three elements are met. (para 24)

• In terms of his request that Tania produce specific documentation to support her claim that he concealed assets as a way of exerting financial control over her, Justice Kraft found that this request misinterpreted the mental element of the tort of IPV. Applying Ahluwalia, Tania only needed to establish Kevork’s intention to “engage in the impugned conduct” (i.e., concealing assets); there is no legal requirement to prove that he “subjectively intended to exercise coercive control or cause a specific type of financial harm.” (para 25)
• In terms of his request for a comprehensive incident schedule that detailed every event, date, and witness to the IPV claim, Justice Kraft noted that IPV often takes place behind closed doors without any witnesses or documentary evidence. Her Honour highlighted that the Supreme Court in Ahluwalia cautioned courts against imposing evidentiary requirements that ignore the isolated environment in which IPV occurs. Tania had already deposed that she would be relying on her own testimony at trial about IPV.

In terms of any prejudice to Kevork, Her Honour also considered that:

• Tania had consistently pleaded the underlying material facts of family violence throughout this case, such as seeking a restraining order in her initial 2017 Application and detailing instances of physical violence in subsequent affidavits.
• Tania acted swiftly by serving the amendments within three weeks of the Supreme Court’s decision in Ahluwalia.
• Kevork refused to answer questions concerning abuse and family violence in his July 27, 2023, questioning, asserting that the issue was irrelevant. As he had been aware of Tania’s family violence allegations, this new tort could not be reasonably characterized as a surprise and therefore did not cause actual prejudice to Kevork.
• Tania consented to further questioning on these new claims, which could be completed by early September 2026, before the trial. She was also prepared to pay costs to Kevork for the preparation of an Amended Answer to address the IPV, assault, and battery claims.

Justice Kraft also found that Tania’s proposed amendments to include the torts of IPV, assault, and battery were neither legally untenable (meaning they were not baseless and without merit) nor were they being made in bad faith. While the amendments introduced additional factual considerations, this would not unfairly disadvantage Kevork.

Tania was ultimately permitted to amend her application to include tort claims for IPV, assault, and battery. Further questioning of both Tania and Kevork was ordered to take place before the trial.

As to the other claims Tania sought to add, Justice Kraft found they would unduly prejudice Kevork. These claims should have been made earlier in the case and, if allowed, would entirely derail the upcoming trial.

This decision is important because it not only addresses the test for amending pleadings to add a claim for the new tort of IPV, but also clarifies the evidentiary requirements associated with the new tort. It shuts down any notion of extensive documentary disclosure for conduct that primarily takes place behind closed doors. It also confirms that survivors need only prove the three elements of the test, without the need to separately prove harm, and that survivors do not need to prove that the person causing harm intended to exert coercive control, but rather that they intended to engage in the conduct claimed.

For another case that applied Ahluwalia, see our case comment on Mitchell v. Mitchell.