Recent case: Abuse of counsel may amount to family violence

In Armstrong v Coupland, Madam Justice Chappel applies a broad and nuanced understanding of the definition of family violence contained in the Children’s Law Reform Act (CLRA).

The motion, brought by the father for increased and unsupervised parenting time with the young child (almost three years old), was the most recent in a long series of court appearances since he and the mother had separated in 2020. The mother responded to this motion seeking supervised parenting time for the father and a restraining order.

A number of different arrangements for the father’s time with the child had been in place: initially, the mother had supervised his time, but she ended this because his behaviour was so problematic. The Children’s Aid Society (CAS) became involved due to concerns that the child had been exposed to adult conflict. It had also been involved with the father in the past with respect to his two older children from another relationship. A private supervision agency terminated its services because dealing with the father was so problematic due to his confrontational manner, constant demands and frequent criticisms.

The father had a history of drug and alcohol use that led him to be highly combative with the mother and others. He had consistently been unwilling to follow the terms of whatever parenting order was in effect at the time, persistently pressured the mother to allow him to have time beyond that set out in the order, frequently made last-minute demands for changes to the schedule and threatened to keep the child.

As well, his communication with the mother’s lawyer was aggressive and showed “a general sense of deregulation.” At different times, the father threatened to report her to the Law Society of Ontario, swore at her, called her “a blight” and insulted her by claiming she was “barren.” In one communication, he said “You’re my next project.” He often wrote to her multiple times in a week, frequently in the evening or on the weekend, demanding an immediate response.

In reaching her decision, Justice Chappel reviewed the facts in detail as well as the relevant sections of the CLRA, including the definition of family violence, and noted:

“The broad definition recognizes the many insidious forms that domestic violence can take other than physical violence and accords each equal weight in the best interests assessment. The specific inclusion of this factor as a mandatory consideration in determining the best interest of children recognizes the profound effects that all forms of family violence can have on children.”

She also notes that section 24(6) of the CLRA, which directs that courts allocate parenting time so that children can have as much time with each parent as is consistent with the children’s best interests “does not create a presumption in favour of equal time or maximum time with each parent.”

Justice Chappel found that the father’s behaviour, including his approach to parenting time and his communications to both the mother and her lawyer constituted family violence, noting that:

“The communications have often been inappropriately aggressive, demanding and threatening  . . .and have been clearly designed to destroy a solicitor client relationship . . . In this sense, the communications amount to a pattern of threatening, coercive and controlling behaviour towards the Respondent.”

Justice Chappel found that it was in the child’s best interests that the father’s time with her be supervised by a professional agency or the CAS, and that it take place no more than twice a week for only two hours. The order also set limits on the father’s communication with the mother’s lawyer, requiring him to restrict his comments to issues pertaining to the child, to keep his messages brief, informative and courteous and to “refrain absolutely from making derogatory comments about counsel, any agreed upon third party or the Respondent, and from setting out personal opinions regarding their character.”

While she did not agree with the mother’s request for a restraining order, her order prohibited the father from coming within 100 metres of the mother’s or maternal grandmother’s home and required that communication with the mother be only through her lawyer or another agreed-upon third party.